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Abstract: Irrigation and drainage canals are some examples of water conveyance systems
spread worldwide. These systems are characterized for the transport phenomena and are
usually operated under closed loop control. Typical considered faults are the unmeasured
water extraction, gate and sensor fault. The classical controller is projected to reject the
unmeasured offtakes and can also accommodate the gate fault. The sensor fault is a critical
fault as it deceives the controller. As the service is based on water levels a falsified information
compromises service quality. Depending on fault intensity, security issues may arise. Here
we propose a sensor fault tolerant architecture to the downstream water level sensor fault.
This architecture is based on two components, first the fault is detected and isolated then the
estimation intensity is used to correct the nominal reference. Based on updating the reference
water depth, additional information is passed to the operating controller for sensor fault
accommodation. The architecture is independent from the controller design and therefore
can be integrated in old irrigation canals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Water is a vital resource for life on earth. Mankind
way of life is based on water consumption: indus-
try, agricultural and domestic activities. Now is time
to use this resource with extreme efficiency to not
compromise the future. Agricultural has a great im-
pact in water consumption and in respect to Portu-
gal 81.8% of the available water is used for irriga-
tion (Raposo, 1996). As water is not always available
1 This work was supported by the Portuguese Government, through
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, under the project
PTDC/EEACRO/102102/2008 - AQUANET, through IDMEC un-
der LAETA.
near the consumers it is conveyed by a network of
canals. The objective of these facilities is to make
water available to farmers while minimizing losses.
The canal losses can be caused by bad networks man-
agement due to oversupply which can cause spillage
along the canal and outflows at the end of the networks
system. As the canal network in most cases is a civil
engineering structure with many years, water losses
due to leaks are often expected. Having a system able
to detect structure faults and supporting the manage-
ment system is an important contribution for water
saving.
A system that includes the capacity of detecting, iso-
lating and identifying faults is called a fault detec-





tion and isolation system (Chen and Patton, 1999).
Many research has been carried out using analytical
approaches and model-based approaches to tackle this
problem. The use of Fault Detection and Isolation
(FDI) in Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) is very impor-
tant in the active way of achieving fault-tolerance, by
detect and isolate the faults. After the fault indica-
tion by FDI, the system can then be reconfigured or
restructured. The fault diagnosis in water conveyance
systems has been addressed in (Bedjaoui et al., 2006;
Bedjaoui et al., 2008; Weyer and Bastin, 2008). A
comparison between different methodologies for leak
detection is presented in (Bedjaoui and Weyer, 2011).
Fault tolerant control in irrigation canals has been
tackled by (Choy and Weyer, 2008) in an approach
based on observers and reconfiguration control to mit-
igate the fault presence.
The sensor fault tolerant architecture proposed in this
paper is based on two tasks: fault diagnosis and ref-
erence update. The fault diagnosis is used to obtain
information about the fault. At the cost of at least
3 water level sensors by pool the downstream water
level sensor fault is correctly isolated and estimated.
As the canal pools are usually equipped with water
level sensor upstream and downstream in each gate
there are already two water level sensors available
by pool. The additional cost is only one water level
sensor by pool. Based on fault estimation the nomi-
nal reference can be updated to neutralize the sensor
fault and restore the service quality. The architecture
is independent from the operating controller allowing
implementation in common irrigation canals.
In section 2 the fault problematic for water irrigation
canals is discussed. Then the algorithm for fault di-
agnosis is presented. Finally the fault tolerant con-
trol feature is added. The performance of this method
is studied in 3 for single and multiple faults and in
particular is shown how the system performance is
affected by the downstream sensor fault. In section 4
final comments and future directions are pointed.
2. FAULT TOLERANT ARCHITECTURE
2.1 Problem description
The flow in water canals is well described by the Saint-
Venant equations, a pair of quasi-linear partial differ-
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. . .+ g ·A(x, t) · (J(x, t)− I(x)) = 0 (2)
where Q(x, t) is the flow, Y (x, t) the water surface
depth, B(x, t) the water surface width, A(x, t) the
water cross-section area, g the gravity acceleration, x
the longitudinal abscissa in the flow direction, t the
time instant, I(x) the bottom slope and J(x, t) the
energy gradient slope. These equations are non-linear
with unknown analytical solution. In a steady con-
figuration, with no time derivatives, the Saint Venant








1− F 2(x) (3)
where F is the Froude number F = VC with C =√
gAT and T is the top width. The ordinary differential
equation (3) allows, for a nominal flow, the backwater
determination Y (x) as long a boundary condition for
the downstream water depth is given.
2.2 Faults definition
Typically in water conveyance systems the existent
faults are commonly classified into one of three cate-
gories: unmeasured flow withdrawal, actuator fault or
sensor fault. For a given pool these faults can produce
a similar effect and therefore is not uncommon to
treat all of them as an unmeasured flow withdrawal.
The gate fault and sensor fault can be classified as
hardware faults since they do not involve any flow
exchange with the surroundings. In Fig. 1 the fault
hierarchical relation considered for irrigation canals
















Fig. 1. Type of faults for an irrigation canal pool i.
may have several water level sensors along the canal













Fig. 2. Fault location for a generic pool i.
responsible for reading the controlled variable, usually
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the downstream water depth. The other sensor faults
are neutral to the system performance as they are used
for monitoring issues. The downstream water depth
information is essential for the operating controller. If
a fault exits on the sensor it will deceive the controller
that will try to follow the erroneous information. The
consequence is that the desired water depth is com-
promised as well as the service quality offered to the
clients. If the fault intensity is negative, the sensor in-
dicates a lower value for the water depth, the controller
will raise the water depth and depending on the fault
intensity flood is a possibility.
2.3 Sensor Fault Diagnosis (SFD)
A sensor fault can be easily detected by comparing the
water depth sensor data with the backwater for steady
state. An important issue here will be the controller
performance, in particular its ability to produce a
smooth response without consecutive wave formation
or oscillations. Some compromise between time de-
tection and false detection has to be considered as the
canal is subjected to disturbances. The estimation of
the pool backwater can only be done with the available
information about the pool state; downstream water
depth given by the sensor ȲL(k) and the downstream
gate flow estimation Q̂(k).
The gates existing in irrigation canals can be classi-
fied as overshot gates, with the flow over the gate,
or undershoot gates, with the flow under the gate.
Considering free flow conditions for the first type and
submerged flow conditions for the last one the gate
equations (Chaudry, 2008) can be used for flow gate
estimation Q̂(k).
At a first stage we assume the information collected
from the canal is totally correct. The backwater is es-
timated using the available information (Q̂(k), ȲL(k))
as a steady state for (3). Consider a generic pool p with
j water level sensors where j = 0means the upstream
location while j = nL means the downstream location
Fig. 2. Once the pool backwater Ŷj(k) is estimated a
residue rj(k) between the sensor value and the esti-
mation Ŷj(k) can be calculated for time instant k, for
all locations except j = nL,
rj(k) = Ȳj(k)− Ŷj(k) (4)
The sensor alarm fj will be triggered if a certain
threshold δy is violated,{ |rj(k)| ≥ δy ⇒ fj = 1
|rj(k)| < δy ⇒ fj = 0 (5)
This procedure is straightforward for all sensors ex-
cept for the downstream sensor. A good way to ac-
count for the pool water depth status is to compute the





Some different scenarios may occur: Υ(k) = 0 mean-
ing that there are no sensor alarms; Υ(k) = 1 there
is only one sensor alarm and its location is given by
the corresponding triggered alarm fj ; Υ(k) = nL −
1 means that all water level sensor are triggered. In
this extreme configuration the most likely situation
is that the information used for backwater estimation
was not consistent with the real system (Q(t), YL(t)),
which is equivalent to say that the fault is located at
downstream. Alarms fj from j = 0 . . . nL − 1 are
reset to zero and fnL is set to one. To robustify the
isolation some additional tests may be included. The
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is verified for j = 0 . . . nL − 1. This is equivalent to
say that all sensor errors must be inside a bound. To
reduce the impact of water level disturbances intro-
duced by the operational controller a moving window
can be used to evaluate the ratio between the number
of triggered alarms inside the window and the window
size. The window dimension τa should be related to
the transport pool delay.
Once the downstream water level sensor is isolated
the next stage is to estimate the fault intensity. For
the monitoring sensors the fault intensity is given by
the corresponding residue rj(k). For the downstream
sensor the procedure is more complex. As the algo-
rithm will be running for all sample times is important
to have a close initial guess. The fault intensity is
closely related to the residue average γ(k). The ex-
pected true value for the water level is initially given
by ŶL = ȲL(k) + γ(k). The search interval is defined
as Γ = [ȲL(k); ȲL(K) + 2γ(k)]. The estimated fault
intensity Fγ is,





and Ŷj(k) have to be in accordance with equation (3).
2.4 Fault Tolerant Controller
The fault tolerant controller is achieved by updating
the nominal system reference R0 by the downstream
sensor fault estimation Fγ . The new reference respon-
sible for tolerant fault control is given by,
Rf = R0 +Gf (s)Fγ (9)
In order to guarantee robustness the update component
is filtered by a first order low pass filter Gf (s) with
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time constant τf to avoid exciting the canal first oscil-
lating mode. The fault tolerant architecture proposed
is schematically indicated in Fig. 3.
Reference












Fig. 3. Fault tolerant architecture.
3. SIMULATION RESULTS
3.1 Irrigation Canal Description
The algorithm performance analysis is done using the
simulator (Nabais et al., 2011) developed for the ex-
perimental water delivery canal hold by the NuHCC
– Hydraulics and Canal Control Center from the
Évora University in Portugal Fig. 4. The experimental
canal has a well known geometry: the pools have a
trapezoidal section with a bottom width of 0.15m,
1 : 0.15 side slope and a maximum height of 0.9m.
The canal inflow is dictated by an electrical MONO-
VAR valve, along the canal the water translation is
assured by a bed slope of 0.0015 and the facility
is designed to a maximum flow of 0.090m3/s. The
canal ends with an overshot gate. In each pool there
are water level sensors of float and counter-weight
type for canal monitoring. The sensors are located at
the upstream, center and downstream end. The water
extraction is done upstream each gate by the exis-
tence of an offtake equipped with a flow meter and
an electrical butterfly to allow water extraction. The
Fig. 4. Irrigation canal configuration.
system is considered in steady state with a nominal
flow Qup = 0.040m3/s and gates elevation U =[








The irrigation canal is considered to be under closed
loop control with local upstream PI controllers (Litrico
et al., 2003). In terms of time–dependency we con-
sider intermittent faults (Isermann, 2011) Fig.5. Con-














Fig. 5. Intermittent faults schematics.
• F pU upstream water depth sensor fault
• F pC center water depth sensor fault
• F pD downstream water depth sensor fault
For each definition an abruptF a and incipientF i fault
are considered. The sensor fault tolerant architecture
is always running and configured with a constant
threshold δy = 0.008m, equal to the water depth
sensor calibration error for the experimental canal, a
moving window of τa = 17.5s, 60% of triggered
alarms inside the window and τf = 40s. The water
depth sensor fault intensity was settled to 2δy.
3.3 Sensor Faults Diagnosis in One Pool
The single faults specifications, start and stop time
instants and intensity, are indicated in Table 1. The
faults will be introduced at pool 3.
Table 1. Single faults specifications.
Faults Start Max Value Stop Intensity
F 3aU 100s [100; 700]s 700s +0.016m
F 3aC 100s [100; 700]s 700s +0.016m
F 3aD 100s [100; 700]s 700s +0.016m
F 3iU 150s [450; 1050]s 1350s +0.016m
F 3iC 150s [450; 1050]s 1350s +0.016m
F 3iD 150s [450; 1050]s 1350s +0.016m
The SFD performance is indicated in Table 2. Fault
isolation time instants are conditioned to the win-
dow size τa considered for false alarm robustness. In
Fig. 6–7 the fault isolation and estimation for abrupt
and incipient faults is done accurately for the down-
stream sensor.
Table 2. SFD performance for single faults.
Faults Start Isolated Stop Isolated
F 3aU 100s 117s 700s 703s
F 3aC 100s 117s 700s 703s
F 3aD 100s 117s 700s 703s
F 3iU 150s 248s 1350s 1270s
F 3iC 150s 319s 1350s 1199s
F 3iD 150s 323s 1350s 1174s
The downstream water level sensor fault estimation
is particular important for the fault tolerant controller
architecture as it is the basic information to proceed
with reference update. In Fig. 7 the fault estimation
for the downstream sensor fault is closely to the real
fault present in the system.
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(a) Fault isolation for F 3aD .





















(b) Fault isolation for F 3iD .
Fig. 6. Downstream single fault isolation.

















(a) Fault estimation for F 3aD .






















(b) Fault estimation for F 3iD .
Fig. 7. Downstream single fault estimation.
3.4 Multiple Sensor Fault Diagnosis in One Pool
It is important to see how fault detection and isolation
is performing when multiple sensor faults are present
in the system. Naturally, if the upstream and center
water depth sensors are facing a fault of the same in-
tensity and signal the algorithm fails as it will indicate
a downstream sensor fault. This is a highly unlikely
situation. The algorithm can deal with multiple sensor
faults as shown in Fig. 8. The upstream and center
sensor are in the interval [400; 700]s simultaneous in a
fault mode with the same intensity but different signs.






















(a) Sensor fault estimation.






















Fig. 8. Upstream and center sensor fault.
3.5 Multiple Faults Diagnosis
On service canals are subjected to water extractions
imposed by users. The nominal controller while trying
to restore the water depth will introduce oscillations
into the canal that will propagate. This way is impor-
tant to know how the SFD algorithm behaves in nor-
mal operating conditions. A water extraction at pool p
is represented by F pO . Three different scenarios were
tested using abrupt faults,
• Test A: downstream water depth sensor faults at
pool 2 and 3 respectively F 2D and F 3D;
• Test B: an offtake fault at pool 2 F 2O and a
downstream water depth sensor fault at pool 3
F 3D;
• Test C: an offtake fault and downstream water
depth fault at pool 3 respectively F 3O and F 3D.
The faults specifications and the SFD performance are
given in Table 3 and in Fig. 9–10. In Test A, Fig. 9,
the fault tolerant architecture is able to detect and
estimate correctly the sensor fault with no interference
during transients. There is no significant impact of the
upstream pool behavior on the fault isolation for pool
3. For Test C, Fig. 10, the algorithm is not deceived by
the existing water extraction at the same location as
the sensor fault and correctly isolates the sensor fault.
In Tests B and C the water extraction causes impact
in fault diagnosis only during transients being more
severe for test C as faults have the same location.
Table 3. SFD architecture performance for
multiple faults.
Faults Start Isolated Stop Isolated
F 2D 100s 117s 700s 703s
F 3D 400s 417s 1000s 1003s
F 2O 100s – 700s –
F 3D 400s 417s 1000s 1004s
F 3O 100s – 700s –
F 3D 400s 442s 1000s 1003s




















(a) Pool residues rj .






















Fig. 9. Fault diagnosis for scenario A.























(a) Pool residues rj .





















(b) Downstream fault estimation.
Fig. 10. Fault estimation for scenario C.
3.6 Fault Tolerant Architecture Performance
In the previous subsections the fault tolerant architec-
ture was always active and therefore the performance
increase introduced may pass unnotice. To show the
impact in service quality we defined a test were the
downstream fault at pool 3 starts at time instant t =
100s and stops at time instant t = 1300s. The fault
intensity remains 2δy = 0.016m. Initially the fault
tolerant architecture is inactive to show how the non-
tolerant architecture compromises the system service
quality when falsified information is provided Fig. 11.
At t = 700s the sensor fault tolerant architecture is
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Fig. 11. System performance under FTC and non-FTC
architectures.
Table 4. Performance criteria comparison between
FTC and non-FTC architectures.
MSE MAE
FTC 0.1× 10−4 0.0042
non-FTC 2.6× 10−4 0.0162
activated and the quality of service is restored. Al-
though the fault tolerant architecture is inactive until
t = 700s the SFD framework is always running and
the fault is well isolated and estimated from t = 100s
to t = 1300s Fig. 12. In Table 4 the error criteria Mean
Square Error (MSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
are presented for both architectures. The short time
test executed nevertheless shows a reduction to 25%
in the MAE for the FTC proposed architecture. It is
important to note that the error criteria is evaluated in
different conditions and time instants. The non toler-
ant architecture starts with nominal conditions and is
unable to deal with the sensor fault. The fault tolerant
architecture begins with a more demanding situation
as there is a deviation from the nominal conditions and
is able to restore the service quality.

















(a) Downstream fault estimation.






















Fig. 12. Fault estimation and pool status under FTC
and non-FTC architectures.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a sensor fault tolerant architec-
ture that allows for downstream sensor fault tolerant
control with a minimum requirement of three level
sensors available on each canal pool. This is a small
investment for water irrigation management compared
to the resulting benefits. The work presented will be
used together with fault detection and isolation for
offtake and hardware faults developed by the authors
to produce a detailed fault diagnosis for canal pools.
In particular, different combinations of multiple faults
were considered, corresponding to demanding situa-
tions where multiple effects can have similar impacts
difficult to isolate. The proposed architecture will be
tested in a real scenario, in particular in the experi-
mental canal own by the NuHCC.
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